The Purpose of India's Security Strategy: Defence, Deterrence and Global Involvement by Gautam Sen

Author:Gautam Sen [Sen, Gautam]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9781000756869
Google: al2yDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 49498716
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-09-30T00:00:00+00:00

Perception of the Indian Defence Policy-Makers

On October 29, 1979, for the first time, the Indian Defence Minister Mr. C. Subramaniam made a comprehensive statement on India’s defence strategy for the next decade. Appendix A gives the entire text. This address set out the basic premise and the defence posture that India would pursue in the next decade. It clearly indicated a realistic non-alignment. Subramaniam pointed out that while India “would remain non-aligned in the rivalries of major power, she will not be non-aligned against her own security or at the cost of her own vital national interests”.

India’s nuclear strategy had been spelled out in explicit terms. The Defence Minister noted the potential nuclear capability of countries like Israael and South Africa. Pakistan was seen as a country striving to manufacture nuclear weapons. In view of these potential nuclear powers and the prevailing nuclear threat from China, Subramaniam stated that he would not be “naïve enough to declare on behalf of all future generations and governments that India will not make nuclear weapons”. He further enumerated the factors which would motivate the Indian decision-makers to go nuclear (see pp 25–26 of Appendix A). Considering these factors, it was easy to judge that the Indians had created a position to take the nuclear decision at any time.

Thus, it can deduced that the India defence planners had already got the blessings of the politicians to go ahead and develop the entire infrastructure for sustaining a nuclear weapon-making programme. However, until the time all the management and command control aspects were ironed out, India would not be actually placing nuclear weapons in the hands of the armed forces.

The emphasis on a conventional defence posture had been elaborated. The Chinese efforts to modernise the armed forces, Pakistan’s acquisition of a new generation of sophisticated military hardware, the oil-rich Middle East countries’ support for Pakistan and the Chinese policies towards South and Southeast Asia, including their attempt to continuously support India’s defence policy at a conventional level, were noted. The Chinese improvement of their military capabilities in Tibet and better China-Pakistan coordination due to the recently developed Karakorum Highway were also seen as serious matters in times of military hostilities with that country.

The paper in the Appendix observed, “China is in a position to wage low intensity conventional war over a long period and even high intensity conventional war with india over an extended period of time”. Hence, the Indian strategy against China needed to be prepared for such contingencies against Pakistan, which would be able to conduct only short-term military ventures. The Indians needed to have “greater mobility and firepower” to contain any Pakistani attack and launch counter-attacks” with a view to gain objectives so that India is not placed at a “strategic disadvantage at the negotiating table.”

From the above, it is clear that the Indian defence policy against China and Pakistan was to be one of deterrence. Hence, there was emphasis on rapid modernisation of weapons and equipment at the conventional level. In view

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